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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

DENISE A. GOTTLIEB,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 46708-2019
Benewah County Case No.
CR-05-2018-546

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

------------)

Should this Court dismiss Gottlieb' s appeal because Gottlieb is a fugitive and has
therefore waived her right to the appellate process? Alternatively, has Gottlieb failed to establish
that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 180-day jail sentence upon her guilty
plea to reckless driving?

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In May 2018, Gottlieb was prohibited by a civil protection order from coming within 300
feet of her neighbor, Bobbi Slayton, "except on public roadways for egress and ingress." (R.,
pp.13-14.) On May 21, 2018, Ms. Slayton was sitting in her parked vehicle on John's Creek
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Road and talking to another neighbor, Paul Maughan, when Gottlieb drove by, pointed her
vehicle in Ms. Slayton’s and Mr. Maughan’s direction, “heavily accelerated” to “approximately
40 miles per hour,” “swerved towards [Ms. Slayton] and [Mr.] Maughan as if she were going to
ram them, swerved back into her lane, sprayed rocks all over [Ms. Slayton’s] vehicle[,] and
continued on.” (R., pp.13-14.) Ms. Slayton and Mr. Maughan both feared that Gottlieb was
going to hit them with her vehicle, and Mr. Maughan “jump[ed] away from [Ms. Slayton’s]
vehicle” because of that fear. (R., pp.13-14.) Mr. Maughan subsequently took photographs of
“the distinct swerve marks in the gravel” and showed them to a responding law enforcement
officer. (R., pp.13-14.)
After taking Ms. Slayton’s and Mr. Maughan’s reports, law enforcement contacted
Gottlieb. (R., pp.13-14.) When the officer questioned her “about what had happened,” Gottlieb
claimed she “did not know what her neighbors were talking about” and asserted they were “out
of control.” (R., p.14.) The officer told Gottlieb her neighbors were “accusing her of swerving
at them in a vehicle” and informed her “you could clearly see where there [were] swerve marks
in the road.” (R., p.14.) Gottlieb denied swerving and exclaimed she did not “‘know what the
fuck is wrong with them (neighbors).’” (R., p.14 (parenthetical notation original).) The officer
arrested Gottlieb for aggravated assault and issued her a “citizen[’]s citation” for misdemeanor
reckless driving. (R., pp.6, 14-15.) Contrary to her initial denials, Gottlieb admitted on the way
to the jail that she did “swerv[e] in the road” but claimed she did so “to miss another vehicle.”
(R., p.15.)
The state charged Gottlieb with aggravated assault in case CR05-18-547 and with
misdemeanor reckless driving in case CR05-18-546. (R., pp.6, 35-36, 43.) Pursuant to a plea
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agreement, Gottlieb entered an

m1

aggravated assault case.

pp.42-45.)

recognizance

(ﬂ

(R.,

E

cases), 6(d) (defendant in

judgment entered through an

Who had been

Gottlieb,

released 0n her

own

combined change 0f plea and sentencing

R., p.20), did not appear at the

hearing (R., p.47; Tr., p.5, Ls.20-22).

misdemeanor

plea t0 reckless driving, and the state dismissed the

M.C.R.

6(a)(3) (governing written guilty pleas in

misdemeanor case may “appear, answer and have
Instead, she entered a written guilty plea,

attorney”).

and her

attorney appeared on her behalf for the sentencing hearing and pronouncement ofjudgment. (R.,

pp.42-45, 47; T11, p.4, L.5

— p.14,

L.17.)

Before pronouncing sentence, the

district court entertained

well as the arguments of Gottlieb’s counsel and the prosecutor.

Victim impact statements, as

(Tr., p.6,

L.3

—

p.14, L.1.)

Ms.

Slayton advised the court that Gottlieb’s actions had “profoundly affected [her] life” and noted

that,

had Gottlieb’s vehicle “been 6 inches

t0 a foot closer to hitting [Ms. Slayton’s] vehicle,”

Ms. Slayton and Mr. Maugham “could be dead.”

Maugham were concerned
— p.7,

that Gottlieb

L.10, p.7, Ls.18-25, p.10, L.15

(Tr., p.7, Ls.1 1-17.)

had violated

— p.1 1,

L.1.)

at least

They

Both Ms. Slayton and Mr.

one protection order.

(Tr., p.6,

also expressed frustration that, while the

felony and misdemeanor cases were pending, Gottlieb was permitted to leave the

purportedly t0 go t0 a medical appointment, but had never returned.

Ms. Slayton hoped Gottlieb

13, p.1 1, Ls.2-10.)

system”

(Tr., p.9,

“realize[d]

Ls.14-18), and both Ms. Slayton and Mr.

some consequences

for her behavior (Tr., p.6, L.13

L.21

— p.9,

What a

(Tr., p.8,

gift

state,

Ls.1-10, p.9, Ls.6-

she has had from the court

Maugham hoped

L.18, p.10, L.9

Gottlieb

— p.1 1,

would face

L.10).

Following the Victim impact statements, Gottlieb’s attorney argued for a Withheld
judgment.
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(Tr., p.1 1,

North Carolina

V.

L.18 — p.13, L.1.) In support of that request, counsel noted that Gottlieb

Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

was then

He

currently in California and intended to stay there.

also represented that Gottlieb

(TL, p.1

1,

L.1

1,

L.19 — p.12, L.3.)

had no prior criminal record, and suggested the Victims could

be adequately protected by a n0 contact order, contemplated by the plea agreement, that
prohibited Gottlieb from coming “within a hundred feet” of them? (TL, p. 12, Ls.4-22.)

The prosecutor objected

was not aware

represented he

t0 a Withheld

until the

judgment.

morning 0f the December

sentencing hearing that Gottlieb intended to enter an

T11, p.5, Ls.2-10.)

(TL, p.13, Ls.15-25.)

The prosecutor did not

m

plea.

14,

The prosecutor

2018, change of plea and

(TL, p.13, Ls.18-20;

ﬂ alﬂ

object t0 Gottlieb doing so, but he argued that Gottlieb

should not “receive the beneﬁt 0f a Withheld judgment without actually admitting to What she
did.” (TL, p.13, Ls.20-25;

ﬂ alﬂ

Tr., p.5, Ls.2-10.)

The court ultimately agreed With
not “appropriate at

all.”

the prosecutor and found that a Withheld

(TL, p.14, Ls.16-18.)

The court indicated

it

judgment was

had reviewed the

“underlying reports that set forth the course 0f conduct” giving rise to the reckless driving
charge, and

it

that Gottlieb

found that conduct “very disturbing.” (TL, p.14, Ls.6-10.) The court also noted

had admitted the reckless driving charge and, although the aggravated assault

charge had been dismissed, the facts underlying the charges demonstrated t0 the court that
Gottlieb

was “someone Who

and was acting

didn’t have any respect for [her] neighbors or respect for the law

in a fashion that

was unacceptable.” (TL,

p. 14, Ls.1 1-16.)

Given Gottlieb’s lack

of prior criminal record and absence of any evidence that Gottlieb had a substance abuse or
mental health issue, the court concluded

it

was “not looking

needs t0 be addressed by imposing a period 0f probation.”
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Counsel appears

t0

at rehabilitation” or

(TL, p.14, L.21

p.15, L.3.)

have misspoken; the plea agreement actually contemplated

would “have no contact 0r knowingly come Within 1 000feet of’
added).)

—

“something that

The

that Gottlieb

the Victims. (R., p.43 (emphasis

court

was

instead “looking at protection of the public” and “deterrence,” both of which the court

concluded could be best achieved by a

(TL, p.14, Ls.19-21, p.15, Ls.3-4.)

jail sentence.

The

court therefore imposed a 180-day jail sentence and ordered that Gottlieb report to jail to begin

serving her sentence 0n

On

January

December

25, 2018. (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-10; R., p.46.)

2019, the prosecutor ﬁled an afﬁdavit, with attachments, advising the

2,

district court that Gottlieb failed to report to the jail t0

25, 2018.

January

4,

(R., pp.48-51.)

2019.

(R., p.52.)

The
It

begin serving her sentence 0n December

district court issued a

appears

Aug., pp.6-143 (iCourt Portal case

bench warrant for Gottlieb’s

that, to this day, the

summary

for

warrant

is still

arrest

outstanding.

on

(E

Case Number CR05-18-0546, State of Idaho

VS.

Denise A. Gottlieb, showing bench warrant never returned/served).)
Gottlieb’s attorney ﬁled a timely notice of appeal

He

also ﬁled a

motion

t0 stay execution

0n January

10,

2019.

0f Gottlieb’s sentence, Which the

(R., pp.53-55.)

district court denied.

(R., pp.56-60.)

On March

18,

2019, Gottlieb’s attorney ﬁled a Rule 35 motion for reconsideration 0f

sentence, requesting that Gottlieb “be relieved

medical reasons

....”

(Aug, pp.1-2 (Rule 35 Motion

the motion, in part because Gottlieb

as of the April 19, 2019, hearing

Rule 35 motion).) The
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from the

had “ignored the

on her Rule 35

district court

jail

sentence imposed in this case given

for Reconsideration).)

court[’]s order

request.

(Aug,

The

state

opposed

and remain[ed] a fugitive”

p.5 (court minutes 0f hearing

0n

found no “bases for modifying” or “suspending” Gottlieb’s

Contemporaneously with the ﬁling of

this brief, the state is

appellate record With or, alternatively, for judicial notice 0f, a

ﬁling a motion to augment the

number 0f documents ﬁled and/or

generated in the underlying criminal case, including Gottlieb’s Rule 35 motion, the district
court’s order denying Gottlieb’s Rule 35 motion, the court minutes of the hearing on Gottlieb’s
Rule 35 motion, and the iCourt Portal case summary generated for Case Number CR05-18-0546,
State 0f Idaho vs. Denise A. Gottlieb, 0n August 13, 2019.
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sentence and denied her Rule 35 motion.
(court minutes of hearing

(Aug, pp.3-4 (order denying Rule 35 motion),

p.5

0n Rule 35 m0tion).)

I.

Gottlieb’s

Appeal Should Be Dismissed

Gottlieb asks this Court t0 review her sentence, claiming

age, lack of criminal history, agreement t0 have

she

“moved

because Gottlieb

is

Gottlieb’s appeal should be dismissed

(Appellant’s brief, pp.2-7.)

a fugitive and

is

not entitled t0 the resources 0f the appellate process.

has been settled for well over a century that an appellate court

Who

0f a defendant

Rodriguez

no further contact With the Victims, and because

out-of-state prior to sentencing with the intention of remaining there to avoid future

contact With the Victims.”

“It

excessive in light of her

it is

V.

United

m

dismiss the appeal

a ﬁJgitive from justice during the pendency of his appeal.”

is

States,

534 (1975); Molinaro

may

V.

507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993).

New

Jersey,

m

420 U.S.

also Estelle V. Dorrough,

396 U.S. 365 (1970); Allen

V.

Georgia, 166 U.S. 138

(1897); Smith V. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876); State V. Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho 175, 179, 244

P.3d 1261, 1265

may

(Ct.

App. 2010)

(citing Ortega-Rodriguez,

dismiss the appeal 0f a defendant

0r her appeal.”).

who

“The decision Whether

is

507 U.S.

2010)

t0 dismiss the appeal

The
179,

State V. Moran—Soto, 150 Idaho 175, 179,

(citing State V. Larrea,

of a criminal defendant

at

1265.

is

“First,

is

two-fold.”

Who

has

within an appellate court’s

244 P.3d 1261, 1265

130 Idaho 290, 292, 939 P.2d 866, 868

“rationale for th[e] fugitive dismissal rule

244 P.3d

239) (“An appellate court

a fugitive from justice during the pendency of his

escaped from custody or absconded from probationary supervision

sound discretion.”

at

(Ct.

(Ct.

App.

App. 1997)).

Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho

at

any judgment produced against a fugitive appellant would be

unenforceable.” Li. Second, “a defendant’s escape during the pendency 0f an appeal essentially

amounts

to a

waiver of the right to appeal; dismissal discourages escape and encourages fugitives

t0 surrender.”

(citation omitted).

I_d.

appeal of a criminal defendant

Who

E m,

at

process.

Who absconded
decision,

130 Idaho

Idaho appellate courts have, in other cases, dismissed the
has absconded and remained

during the appellate

at large

292, 939 P.2d at 868 (dismissing appeal because defendant,

supervision and remained a fugitive at the time her appeal

was not

was submitted

m

“entitled t0 resources 0f the appellate process”); State V. Schneider, 126 Idaho

624, 626, 888 P.2d 798, 800 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Idaho Supreme Court’s dismissals in

McKaughten, N0. 13677, noting

Creamer, N0. 13126, and State

V.

appellants “remained at large and

were

ﬂ

for

that in both cases the

fugitives at the time their appeals

State V. Billings, 137 Idaho 827, 829, 54 P.3d 470,

472

were dismissed”);

App. 2002)

(Ct.

m

(citing State V. Nath,

137 Idaho 712, 52 P.3d 857 (2002), and Schneider, s_um).4
Gottlieb

is

a fugitive and, therefore, not entitled t0 the resources of the appellate process.

Consistent with the misdemeanor criminal rules and the consent 0f the prosecutor, the district
court sentenced Gottlieb in absentia

The

M.C.R.

6(d).

day

sentence 0n

jail

court’s

on December

14,

judgment required Gottlieb

December

25, 2018.

(R., p.46.)

2018.

(ﬂ

t0 report to jail to

L.17 — p.15, L.10);

begin serving her 180-

Gottlieb failed to d0 so, and the district

court issued a bench warrant for her arrest 0n January 4, 2019.

19,

T11, p.5,

2019, hearing on her Rule 35 motion, the warrant had

(R., pp.48-52.)

still

As 0f the

not been served and Gottlieb

“remain[ed] a fugitive.” (Aug, p.5 (court minutes of hearing 0n Rule 35 motion).)
in fact,

it

appears that Gottlieb

warrant for her

4

arrest.

still

(R., p.52;

Nath, Schneider, and Billings are

To

this day,

has not served one day of her sentence and has an active

Aug, pp.6-14

all

April

(iCourt Portal case

summary

for

Case Number

distinguishable because, at the time 0f the appellate court’s

consideration of each 0f those cases, the defendants were n0 longer at large.
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CR05-18-0546,

of Idaho

State

By

retumed/served).)

vs.

Denise

A.

Gottlieb,

showing bench warrant never

failing t0 appear for her court ordered jail time

and remaining

at large,

Gottlieb has divested herself 0f any entitlement to the resources 0f the appellate process and, as
such, her appeal should be dismissed.

II

Alternatively, Gottlieb

Has Failed To Establish That The

District Court Clearly

Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Even

if this

failed to establish

Court considers the merits of Gottlieb’s sentencing challenge, Gottlieb has

an abuse of discretion. The length of a sentence

discretion standard considering the defendant’s entire sentence.

is

reviewed under an abuse 0f

State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722,

726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State V. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

It is

presumed

portion 0f the sentence will be the defendant's probable term 0f conﬁnement. Li. (citing

"fre—Vino,

132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

it is

this

reasonable, however, if

it

within statutory limits, the

V.

Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d

burden the appellant must show that the sentence

any reasonable View 0f the

facts.

Ba_ker,

136 Idaho

at

is

577, 38 P.3d at 615.

excessive under

A

sentence

The maximum sentence
The

guidelines.

district court

(R., p.46.)

is

appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting

society 0r any of the related sentencing goals 0f deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

1401(2).

ﬁxed

a clear abuse of discretion. State V. Baker,

136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State

27 (2000)). T0 carry

is

m

that the

for

misdemeanor reckless driving

imposed a 180-day

The sentence

is

jail sentence,

is

six

which

months
falls

in jail.

Li
LC.

§

49-

within the statutory

also reasonable in light 0f the seriousness of the offense,

Gottlieb’s demonstrated inability or unwillingness to follow court orders, and the need to protect
society.
Gottlieb drove her vehicle towards the victims at a relatively high rate of speed, swerved
to within “6 inches to a foot” of the victims “as if she were going to ram them,” and then
“sprayed rocks all over [the victim’s] vehicle” and drove away. (R., pp.13-14.) At the time,
Gottlieb was prohibited by a civil protection order from being within 300 feet of one of the
victims. (R., pp.13-14.) When confronted by law enforcement, Gottlieb claimed it was the
victims who were “out of control,” and she gave conflicting versions of the events, initially
denying having swerved at all but later admitting she swerved “to miss another vehicle.” (R.,
pp.14-15.)
Ms. Slayton, the victim with whom Gottlieb was supposed to have no contact at the time
of the offense, explained in her victim impact statement that Gottlieb’s actions “had
consequences” and had “profoundly affected [Ms. Slayton’s] life.” (Tr., p.7, Ls.11-14.) She
elaborated:
Because she has impacted my life. I’m in fear when I’m out in the
community. I was in more fear when she lived here being in my own home and
on my own property. And that’s going to impact me for a long time and that’s
pretty significant to me being as I worked in law enforcement for 14 years. My
husband worked in law enforcement and retired. We were correctional officers in
a 1500-bed jail facility and he worked on the streets in Stockton, California; one
of the top five worse [sic] cities to live in in this nation.
I have never in that time had to have video surveillance to protect myself,
restraining orders to protect myself. I never felt as scared to move about in my
own community as I do in St. Maries due to Denise Gottlieb. And that’s
significant in part too because the type of people that we housed at the jail that I
was – it was a direct supervision jail. We were face to face with gang members,
murderers, rapists, molesters, serial killers, death row inmates, and I’ve never had
to protect myself like I’ve had to do here.
This is why I moved here to escape that environment and to get away from
that type of environment and I only moved here to find it was worse for me, it
9

became worse for me, and she’s off in California. She’s escaped. And she
doesn’t even have to come to her own court case and I’m left and Paul Maughan
is left with the impact of her and what she has done to us.
(Tr., p.8, L.11 – p.9, L.13.) In addition, both Ms. Slayton and Mr. Maughan represented that
Gottlieb had violated protection orders with impunity (Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.7, L.10, p.7, Ls.18-25,
p.10, L.15 – p.11, L.1), and they were both frustrated that Gottlieb had been permitted to leave
the state while her criminal charges were pending and had not yet returned (Tr., p.8, Ls.1-10, p.9,
Ls.6-13, p.11, Ls.2-10).
In fashioning Gottlieb’s sentence, the district court specifically articulated the goals of
sentencing, noting that the “main goal … is the protection of society.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-5.) The
court reviewed the “underlying reports” and found, based on that review, that Gottlieb’s conduct
in this case was “very disturbing.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.6-10.) Gottlieb’s behavior demonstrated to the
court that Gottlieb “didn’t have any respect for [her] neighbors or respect for the law and was
acting in a fashion that was unacceptable.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.11-16.) Finding deterrence of Gottlieb
and “others who might engage in this type of behavior” was important, the court concluded that a
withheld judgment was not “at all” appropriate. (Tr., p.14, Ls.16-18.) The court was also
unconvinced that “there’s a purpose to be served by probation at all.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.21-23.)
Because Gottlieb had no prior criminal record and no substance abuse or mental health issues,
the court was “not looking at rehabilitation” but was instead “looking at protection of the public
and … deterrence.” (Tr., p.14, L.23 – p.15, L.4.) With those goals in mind, the court imposed a
180-day jail sentence. (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-10.)
Gottlieb challenges the court’s sentencing determination, claiming that the court’s
decision “to incarcerate Ms. Gottlieb instead of placing her on probation was an abuse of
discretion because the decision was inconsistent with the criteria articulated in Idaho Code § 19-

10

2521,” and that “[n]o reasonable view of the fact of this case support [sic] a finding that a period
of incarceration for 180 days was necessary to” achieve the goals of sentencing. (Appellant’s
brief, p.2.) Gottlieb’s arguments fail.
Idaho Code § 19-2521 sets forth a list of factors a sentencing court must consider in
determining whether to place a criminal defendant on probation or impose a sentence of
incarceration. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2521(1), a court may find a sentence of incarceration is
“appropriate for protection of the public” for any one or all of a number reasons, including that:
“[a] lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime,” I.C. § 192521(1)(c); “imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the defendant,”
I.C. § 19-2521 (1)(d); or “[i]mprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons
in the community,” I.C. § 19-2521(1)(e). The district court found all of these factors in this case.
Its conclusion that a sentence of incarceration, as opposed to probation, was appropriate is
therefore in no way “inconsistent with the criteria articulated in” subsection (1) of Idaho Code §
19-2521.
Nor was the court’s sentencing determination “inconsistent with the criteria articulated
in” subsection two of the statute. That subsection sets forth a non-exhaustive list of grounds that,
“while not controlling the discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a
sentence of imprisonment.” I.C. § 19-2521(2). Among the listed grounds are that: “[t]he
defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened harm,” I.C. § 19-2521(2)(a); “[t]he
defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten harm,” I.C. §
19-2521(2)(b); “[t]he defendant acted under a strong provocation,” I.C. § 19-2521(2)(c); “[t]here
were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s criminal conduct,” I.C. §
19-2521(2)(d); and “[t]he victim of the defendant’s criminal conduct induced or facilitated the

11

commission of the crime,” LC.

§ 19-2521(2)(e).

Not one of these grounds

Gottlieb’s criminal conduct—driving her vehicle in a reckless

applies in this case.

manner by swerving toward

the

Victims—certainly “threaten[ed] harm,” and the facts 0f this case strongly suggest, and the
district court effectively

that Gottlieb “acted

found, that Gottlieb intended the threat. There

is

no evidence suggesting

under strong provocation,” that her actions were in any

excused, 0r that the Victims “induced 0r facilitated” the crime.

way

justiﬁed or

In light of the absence of these

mitigating statutory criteria, the district court acted entirely consistently with I.C. § 19-2521(2) in

concluding a sentence of incarceration was warranted.
Gottlieb’s claim that “[n]o reasonable

that a period

p.2)

is

of incarceration

is

View 0f the

facts

of this case support

[sic]

a ﬁnding

necessary” to achieve the goals of sentencing (Appellant’s brief,

equally unavailing. Gottlieb cites her age, lack 0f prior criminal history, fact that she had

“agreed as part 0f sentencing t0 not come Within 1000 feet 0f the Victims,” and fact that she “had

moved

out—of—state prior to sentencing” as factors she claims militate against the sentence

imposed. (Appellant’s

brief, pp.4-7.)

But neither Gottlieb’s age and lack of prior history nor the

existence of a prior n0 contact order that prohibited her from

the Victims

coming Within 300

feet

0f one of

(ﬂ R., pp.13-14) kept her from engaging in the conduct that formed the bases of the

reckless driving charge to

Which she pled

guilty

dismissed pursuant t0 the plea agreement in this case.
of-state prior t0 sentencing” in

that

was

“moved

out-

and the aggravated assault charge

any way mitigating.

Nor

is

the fact that Gottlieb

The Victims expressed concern

at the

sentencing hearing that Gottlieb had purposely removed herself from the state to avoid
accountability for her actions (TL, p.8, Ls.1-10, p.9, Ls.6-13, p.11, Ls.2-10); and that concern

has

now been

borne out by the fact that Gottlieb failed to appear to serve her jail sentence and

wanted 0n an active

arrest warrant in this case (R., pp.48-52;

12

Aug, pp.6-14

is

(iCourt Portal case

summary

for

Case Number CR05-18-0546, State of Idaho

Denise A. Gottlieb, showing bench

vs.

warrant never returned/served).)

Finally,

court

even assuming the factors Gottlieb

was aware of those

factors at the time

cites are in

any sense mitigating, the

0f sentencing and determined, in

its

district

discretion, that

the “very disturbing” nature 0f the offense outweighed those considerations and called for a

sentence 0f incarceration, both t0 protect society and t0 deter Gottlieb and others from engaging
in similar conduct in the future.

(TL, p.14, L.6

—

p.15, L.4.)

That the court did not elevate

Gottlieb’s alleged mitigating factors over the need t0 protect society does not establish an abuse

of discretion.

E,

gg,

State V.

Windom, 150 Idaho

873, 880, 253 P.3d 310, 317 (2011)

(appellate court’s “standard of review does not require (nor indeed, does

court]

conduct

t0

considerations

[its]

in

own
order

it

permit) [the appellate

evaluation 0f the weight to be given each 0f the sentencing

t0

determine

Whether

[it]

agree[s]

with the

district

court's

conclusion”); State V. Felder, 150 Idaho 269, 276-77, 245 P.3d 1021, 1028-29 (Ct. App. 2010)

(“[W]hile the mitigating factors identiﬁed by [the defendant]
sentencing, a court

manner.”

is

not required to assess 0r balance

.
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all

may have some

relevancy t0

0f the sentencing goals in an equal

m
The

state respectfully requests this

a fugitive and

is,

Court to dismiss Gottlieb’s appeal because Gottlieb

therefore, not entitled to the resources

the state asks this Court to

DATED this

is

of the appellate process. Alternatively,

afﬁrm Gottlieb’s conviction and sentence.

13th day of August, 2019.

_/s/_Lori A. Fleming
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

CERTEICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this

copy of the attached
File and Serve:

13th day of August, 2019, served a true and correct
t0 the attorney listed below by means of iCourt

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

CRAIG W. ZANETTI

AMENDOLA DOTY & BRUMLEY, PLLC
adngadbattorneys.com

_/s/_Lori A. Fleming
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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